plakas v drinski justia

6. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. Code Ann. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. He swore Koby would not touch him. 1993 . French v. State, 273 Ind. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. In any selfdefense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. Id. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Cited 201 times, 855 F.2d 1256 (1988) | Filing 89. 2. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Justia. They noticed that his clothes were wet. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. He appeared to be blacking out. Perras took the poker. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . . Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. The alternatives here were three. It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. 4. 2. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. On the way to the scene of the accident, Cain noticed Plakas walking along State Road 10. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. The handcuffs were removed. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Plakas turned and faced them. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Sergeant King stood just outside it. Toggle navigation . King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. 1988). See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. Cited 42 times, 909 F.2d 324 (1990) | Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Perras took the poker. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions.

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